Representation recovers information by Thornton, Chris
Representation Recovers Information
Chris Thornton
COGS/Informatics
University of Sussex
Brighton
BN1 9QH
UK
c.thornton@sussex.ac.uk
September 2, 2009
Abstract
Early agreement within cognitive science on the topic of representation
has now given way to a combination of positions. Some question the sig-
nificance of representation in cognition. Others continue to argue in favor,
but the case has not been demonstrated in any formal way. The present
paper sets out a framework in which the value of representation-use can be
mathematically measured, albeit in a broadly sensory context rather than
a specifically cognitive one. Key to the approach is the use of Bayesian
networks for modeling the distal dimension of sensory processes. More rel-
evant to cognitive science is the theoretical result obtained, which is that a
certain type of representational architecture is necessary for achievement
of sensory efficiency. While exhibiting few of the characteristics of tradi-
tional, symbolic encoding, this architecture corresponds quite closely to
the forms of embedded representation now being explored in some embed-
ded/embodied approaches. It becomes meaningful to view that type of
representation-use as a form of information recovery. A formal basis then
exists for viewing representation not so much as the substrate of reason-
ing and thought, but rather as a general medium for efficient, interpretive
processing.
Keywords: representation, information, sensory embedding, close cou-
pling, cognitive informatics
1 Introduction
Questions about representation-usage have been the subject of a lively debate
in cognitive science for many years (e.g., Brooks, Reasoning, 1991; van Gelder,
1995; Beer, 2003; Svensson and Ziemke, 2005). The broad-based acceptance of
the computational metaphor in the early years of the field went hand-in-hand
with the idea that representation must be a key element of cognitive activity:
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it is, after all, a key element of computational activity (Wheeler, 1996). But
more recent times have seen mounting resistance to the idea (Winograd and
Flores, 1986) with Brooks’ publications on ‘Intelligence without Representation’
(Brooks, 1991b) and ‘Intelligence without Reason’ (Brooks, 1991a) creating a
watershed for new thinking on the topic.
In developing this debate between pro- and anti-representationalist camps,
cognitive science can be seen as having reworked the traditional dichotomy be-
tween rationalist and empiricist philosophies of knowledge. Anti-representationalism
broadly aligns with empiricism, emphasizing the way cognition is grounded in
agent/environment interaction. Representationalism broadly aligns with ratio-
nalism, emphasizing the way cognition is grounded in processes of reasoning.
But in cognitive science the distinction has been made less anthropocentric and
given a mechanistic foundation. Brooks’ assertion that ‘the world is its own best
representation’ thus contrasts with Locke’s thesis ‘there is nothing in the mind
save that which is attained through the senses’ primarily in its coverage of non-
human intelligence and its provision of a more technical sense of constituency.
Cognitive science has also brought a stronger sense of there being middle
ground in the debate. While dismissing the general value of representation in AI,
Brooks, for example, was ready to include the operation of ‘build maps’ and even
‘plan changes to the world’ in his proposed subsumption architecture (Brooks,
1986). This suggested an acceptance of there being some role for representation.
In the field of vision research, Ballard appeared to concede something similar.
Questioning Marr’s representation-based conception of visual processing (Marr,
1982), Ballard proposed instead the method of animate vision (Ballard, 1991).
This would make full use of the possibilities of agent-action to facilitate the
visual task.1 But as with Brooks’ situated approach, Ballard’s animate-vision
proposal exhibited some representationalist features, e.g., its recognition of the
need for ‘object centered reference frames’ (p. 77).
While some implicitly conceded the possibility of middle ground, others ar-
gued for its inevitability. Accepting the viability of non-representational strate-
gies in many cases, Kirsh (1996) noted using the world ‘as its own best rep-
resentation’ must fail in those cases where salient features of the environment
are not sensorily accessible. Clark and Toribio (1994) made a similar point in
their definition of the ‘representation-hungry’ domain. This characterizes the
situation where action must be coordinated with features of the environment
which are not accessible through sensory experience.2
But while many authors have argued that the need for representation must
‘kick in’ at some point, the problem has been to give a formal account of when
and why. This is the task tackled by the present paper. Using Bayesian networks
to model distal-to-proximal structures, it shows how measurements can be made
of distal sensory information, i.e., the content of proximal stimuli treated as
information about distal phenomena. The constraint then emerges that sensory
1In the simplest case, the method exploits gaze control, described by Ballard as ‘the central
asset of animate vision’ (Ballard, 1991, p. 61).
2Such domains are closely related to the ones which exhibit ‘type 2’ learning problems in
the type-1/type-2 framework of (Clark and Thornton, 1997).
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architectures must have the right representational properties in order to be
informationally efficient. On that basis it is argued that representation use, in
its most basic form, can be understood as a form of information recovery.
The paper is in eight sections. The next section (Section 2) introduces use of
the Shannon information metric for measurement of distal sensory information.
Section 3 introduces use of Bayesian networks for modeling distal-to-proximal
mappings. Section 3 presents illustrative examples involving sensory schemes
in autonomous and non-autonomous agents. Adressing the question of how
efficiency can be achieved in distal sensing, Section 4 articulates the reversal
principle for information optimization. This is related to cognitive concerns
in Section 5, where the type of architecture required for sensory efficiency is
shown to be a form of representational structure. Section 6 relates that form to
other schemes from the literature, involving embedded representation. Section
7 considers how the provision of a theoretical grounding for such schemes affects
their explanatory content. Section 8 offers concluding comments.
2 Distal sensory information
Informational analyses of sensing typically aim to measure the content of recep-
tor signals, i.e., the informational properties of the patterns of energy impinging
on receptors. In contrast, the present approach aims to measure the information
content of states of the distal stimulus, as mediated by proximal stimuli. Con-
centration on the distal dimension places the analysis outside frameworks such
as (Tononi et al. 1994; Tononi et al. 1996; Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999; Lungarella
and Pfeifer, 2001; Lungarella et al. 2005; Lungarella and Sporns, 2005). These
do not distinguish between distal and proximal stimuli. They also treat receptor
signals as continuous data, to be rendered into a discrete form using first and
second order density functions. The present approach, on the other hand, treats
receptor data as discrete in origin. Other informational analyses of sensing are
often technology-specific (e.g., Webster, 1999; Wilson, 2005; Usher and Keat-
ing, 1996) or modal in nature, concerning sensory processes of audition, vision,
olfaction etc., (e.g., Sabins, 1978; Mather, 1999). Laming (1986) has developed
an amodal analysis as have Brignell and White (1994) but these again focus on
information relating to proximal stimuli.
The starting point for the present analysis is Shannon’s definition of infor-
mation (Shannon, 1948; Shannon and Weaver, 1949). This equates information
with uncertainty-reduction. In Shannon’s framework, the amount of informa-
tion gained when probability attributions for a variable change, is the reduction
obtained in the associated entropy (H).3 Figure 1 illustrates the idea with re-
gard to the weather. Treated as a variable whose possible values are known to
3The entropy H of probability distribution P is defined to be
−
X
i
Pi log2 Pi
where Pi is the probability of the ith alternative. Taking logs to base 2 allows information
to be expressed in bits. Informally, entropy is a measure of the uniformity of the distribution.
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P(sun)=0.6 
P(rain)=0.4 
P(sun)=0.8 
P(rain)=0.2 
H = 0.97 H=0.72 
 0.97 - 0.72 = 0.25 bits
Information 
A B
Figure 1: Information viewed as uncertainty reduction. The change from dis-
tribution A to distribution B implies a reduction in uncertainty, which can be
measured in terms of the reduction in the entropy of the distributions.
be ‘sun’ and ‘rain’, the change from assumed distribution A to assumed dis-
tribution B implies a reduction in uncertainty, the size of which is found by
subtracting the entropy of distribution B from the entropy of distribution A.
Entropy being essentially a measure of the ‘flatness’ of the distribution, the dif-
ference in this case is the relatively small value of 0.25. Assuming logs taken to
base 2, this yields an information value of 0.25 bits.
Typically, entropy-based measurement of uncertainty-change is used to es-
tablish the informational value of a message for a given receiver. The way in
which the message alters the receiver’s attributions of probability is established;
measurement of the entropy-change then identifies the message’s information
content for that receiver. In the present case, however, the requirement is to
measure the level of information that proximal stimulation provides about a dis-
tal stimulus. It will be necessary to adapt the measure to fit the purpose; but
this should be done without undermining its generality. No arbitrary restric-
tions should be placed on the constitution of the distal stimulus — henceforth
termed the ‘target’. It should be possible for it to be a simple object (e.g.,
a bird), an object of multiple parts (e.g., a queue) or any salient feature of
agent/environment engagement (e.g., a hiding place).4 We also need to accom-
modate the possibility of proximal stimulation providing misinformation about
the distal stimulus.
A strategy which seems promising initially involves using the mutual infor-
mation measure (Cover and Thomas, 1991). We treat the target as one random
discrete variable and the proximal stimulus as another. We then calculate the
mutual information between the two. Letting T represent the target variable
and S the proximal stimulus, we evaluate
I(S;T ) =
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
p(s, t) log2
(
p(s, t)
p1(s)p2(t)
)
. (1)
4The paper is not concerned with the ontological issue of how or whether such stimuli
might exist.
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Given joint probability distribution p(s, t) over variables S and T and marginal
distributions p1(x) and p2(t), the mutual information I(S;T ) measures the
amount of information variable S provides about variable T (and vice versa).
This would seem to be what is wanted: a measure of the amount of information
which the proximal stimulus provides about the target.
Unfortunately, the approach fails for two reasons. The amount of mutual
information is not limited by the uncertainty associated with T itself. There
is the potential for paradoxical ‘measurements’ in which sensory information
exceeds the amount which would be obtained through direct access to the target.
(Indeed, this will generally be the case if S has more values than T , since,
other things being equal, a larger number of probabilities generates a larger
entropy.) Second, there is the problem that levels of mutual information are
always positive. There is no way to accommodate the way in which the proximal
stimulus might be misinformative about the target. The problem is illustrated
in Figure 2.
Informative proximal stimulus
p(rain) = 1.0
p(sun)  = 0.0
 T S
Misinformative proximal stimulus
p(rain) = 0.8
p(sun)  = 0.2
p(rain) = 1.0
p(sun)  = 0.0
T S
p(rain) = 0.2
p(sun)  = 0.8
Figure 2: Informative v. misinformative sensing.
Mutual information measures the amount of information one variable pro-
vides about another but treats the two variables as separate entities with po-
tentially different values and ranges. There is no sensitivity to the degree of
match between particular values and probabilities: it is the relative entropic
properties which count. For measurement of sensory information, however, we
need precise alignment. Where one variable is treated as a proxy for the other,
per-value correspondences are important and distinctions can be made between
informative and misinformative scenarios (as in Figure 2).
We also require an approach which can register a difference between informa-
tion and misinformation, i.e., an information value with a boolean property. For
this purpose, the boolean bit is introduced. This is a hybrid boolean/information
value. The value of 1 boolean bit of information (termed ‘bbit’ below) is defined
to be 1 bit of information where information increases certainty of a correct in-
terpretation, and -1 bit where information increases certainty of an incorrect
interpretation. A boolean bit is thus an ordinary bit of information but with a
sign indicating whether or not the information contributes to a correct or true
interpretation.
Measuring information in bbits, we have the means of balancing information
against misinformation. For this purpose, the analysis will continue to view
distal and proximal stimuli as instantiations of random discrete variables. The
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former will continue to be termed the ‘target’. The latter will now generally
be termed the ‘sensor’. Tv will denote instantiation of the target to a partic-
ular value v, i.e., the distribution which assigns probability 1.0 to v and zero
elsewhere. S|Tv is then the conditional distribution on S given Tv.
The initial level of uncertainty regarding the target is the entropy of its
maximally uncertain (i.e., flat) distribution. This can be calculated simply as
the log of the number of values of T :
log2 |T | (2)
In adopting S as a sensor for T , the agent treats conditional distributions
on S as proxies for conditioning distributions of T . The change in the entropy
of S when T adopts a certain value v is then
∆H(S, Tv) = log2 |T | −H(S|Tv) (3)
This entropy-change, however, could be informative or misinformative. To
decide which, we need to discover whether the conditional distribution S|Tv
forms a correct or incorrect approximation of Tv. To find the similarity of two
distributions X and Y , we can use the Kullback-Leibler distance (Kullback,
1987).5
DKL(X ‖ Y ) =
∑
i
X(i) log
X(i)
Y (i)
(4)
S|Tv forms a correct approximation of Tv if it is more similar to Tv than
to the distribution for some other state. Its Kullback-Leibler distance, in this
case, must be less than half the distance for different states, i.e,. the distance
for some Tv and Tw where v 6= w. We can therefore obtain a measurement in
bbits using this half distance — labeled δ below — as a threshold. Specifically,
we use
I(S, Tv) =
{
∆H(S, Tv) if DKL(S|Tv ‖ Tv) < δ
−∆H(S, Tv) otherwise
(5)
This defines the information content in bbits of a particular Tv given S used
as a proxy. By averaging these quantities, we then arrive at an overall measure
of the informational value of S with respect to T .
I(T :S) =
∑
v∈T
I(S, Tv)
|T |
(6)
This is termed the distal sensory information. It can be viewed as the
average information gain conferred by states of T given use of S. We can see it
as measuring the bbits of information of those states treated as distal ‘signals’.
But it is also the bbits of information which the agent obtains simply by treating
S as a sensor for T . On that basis, we might see I(T :S) as the distal sensor gain:
5In this metric, the divisor distribution is assumed to have no zero values.
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the gain obtained by treating S in this way. In what follows, both interpretations
will be used although the term ‘distal sensory information’ will be preferred in
general and the qualifier ‘distal’ will often be dropped since no non-distal values
will be under consideration.
I(T :S) performs in the way we need. Being expressed in bbits, the value may
be positive or negative, indicative of information or misinformation. But we also
have the the requisite cap on absolute value. Where S is generally informative
about the state of T , the sensory information is positive. Where it is generally
misinformative, the sensory information is negative. In neither case, however,
can the absolute value exceed the uncertainty associated with T itself. There is
no danger of paradoxically large measurements.
3 The distal-to-proximal mapping
Equation (6) provides the means of measuring the information provided by a
proximal stimulus given some distal target. But to apply it, we must evaluate
H(S|Tv)
which entails accessing the conditional probability distribution P (S = s|Tv).
To discover what this is, we need to know how the target influences the sensor:
we need to analyze the distal-to-proximal mapping.
(A) (B)
(C) (D)
T
T S T
S
S T S
Figure 3: Sample sensory schemes.
There are many possible forms the mapping might take. We might have a
trivial scenario in which the target influences the sensor directly. This might be
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the case, for example, where the target is something like ambient temperature
and the sensor is a kind of temperature receptor. Here, there could be a 1-
to-1 mapping between values of the target and values of the sensor. More
commonly, the target will influence the sensor indirectly, via some configuration
of intermediate variables. In such cases, determining the conditional probability
distribution relating target to sensor involves taking the intermediate structure
of influences into account.
Figure 3 illustrates some of the possibilities. Schematic (A) is the situation
where target T influences sensor S directly. The other schematics illustrate
cases with intermediate structure. Schematic (B) is relatively simple: the tar-
get influences one intermediate variable, which then influences the sensor. A
real-world example would be the case where the target variable is the status of
a gas ring on a cooker (alight or not) and the intermediate variable is ambient
temperature. There may also be divergent/convergent influences between vari-
ables as illustrated in (C) and (D). In order to evaluate sensory information in
a particular scheme, we need to discover how such influences combine to act on
the sensor’s distribution. This can be determined by treating the configuration
of variables as a Bayesian network (Pearl, 1985; Pearl, 2000).
Sun
Rain
Temp
Humid
Sun=yes Sun=no
0.3 0.7
Sun
yes
no
Rain=yes Rain=no
0.0 1.0
0.6 0.4
Sun
yes
no
Temp=high Temp=low
0.8 0.2
0.5 0.5
Rain Temp Humid=yes Humid=no
yes
yes
no
no
high
low
high
low
0.9
0.4
0.5
0.3
0.1
0.6
0.5
0.7
Given information that P(Sun=yes) = 1.0
P(Humid=yes) = (0.5 x 0.8 x 1.0) + (0.3 x 0.2 x 1.0) = 0.46
P(Humid=no)   = (0.5 x 0.8 x 1.0) + (0.7 x 0.2 x 1.0) = 0.54
(and ignoring zero-valued terms)
Figure 4: Bayesian inference using a network of four variables.
In the Bayesian network formalism, any variable Y which has a direct in-
fluence on variable X is said to be X ’s parent. Variable X is then said to
be Y ’s child or descendant, with any child of a descendant also defined to be
a descendant. The assumption is made that, in all cases, two variables are
conditionally independent of all non-descendants given their parents. This is
another way of saying that variables can be viewed as being influenced solely by
their parents. A complete record of parental influences fully specifies the joint
probability distribution for the variables. This ‘complete record’ is a Bayesian
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network.
Figure 4 illustrates use of a Bayesian network of four variables for purposes of
calculating the relative probability of a sunny day being humid. Each variable in
the network (the oval shapes) represents a different aspect of the weather (sun,
rain, temperature, humidity). Each has an attached conditional probability
table (CPT) which specifies the distributions imposed by possible combinations
of parental values. The data are arranged so as to capture the idea that the state
of the weather (sunny or not) influences the rainfall and the temperature, and
that these two variables jointly influence whether it is humid. By propagating
probabilities through the network, it is possible to calculate that the probability
of a sunny day being humid is 0.46.
Within the Bayesian net formalism, there are general procedures for cal-
culating distributions on variables, given constraints applying anywhere in the
network (Korb and Nicholson, 2003). However, given the strict, feed-forward
structure of this network, probabilities can be calculated by deriving joint prob-
abilities working forwards (i.e., top-down) through the network as indicated in
the lower, right part of the figure.6
Bayesian nets can also be used to assess the way relationships in a network
of variables may produce distributions on a sensory variable, contingent on the
adoption of a certain state of a target variable. Modeling the distal-to-proximal
mapping as a Bayesian network then allows derivation of conditional distribu-
tions. This is exactly what we need for measurement of sensory information.
To illustrate, the Bayesian network of Figure 4 is re-conceptualized as a sensory
scheme in Figure 5. The ‘Sun’ variable is treated as target T and the ‘Humid’
variable becomes sensor S. ‘Rain’ and ‘Temp’ are then variables intermediate
between target and sensor.
Rain
Temp
T S 
Sun Humid
yes
no
low
high
no
yesyes
no
Figure 5: Bayesian net in a sensory configuration.
6The simplicity of the calculations in this case is due to the the way in which the zero
probability for Rain=yes given Sun=yes, combined with the evidence that Sun=yes, ensures
all terms associated with the top half of the Humidity probability table are zero-valued, and
therefore not shown.
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To measure distal sensory information we need to calculate probability dis-
tributions on the sensor given particular values of the target, as per equation
(6). Given that the system of variables connecting target to sensor forms a feed-
forward network, this can be done using forwards propagation of joint probabil-
ities. By taking a Bayesian view of the network of influences connecting target
to sensor, we are able to calculate distributions over sensory values consequent
on distributions at the target. Invoking equations (4), (5) and (6) we can then
calculate sensory information.
3.1 Example 1: the green-ball robot
Using this Bayesian approach, distal-to-proximal mappings of any complexity
can be modeled in a form which enables distal sensory information to be mea-
sured. For a simple illustration, consider Figure 6. This depicts the functionality
of a humanoid toy robot whose behavioral repertoire includes ‘bowling’ a small,
green ball at some red skittles.7 The robot uses a green-light sensor to discrim-
inate the presence of the ball in its ‘visual field’. On detecting the ball (i.e., on
registering green light), a ball-grasping action is triggered and this leads on to
X S T
ball 
skittle 
green 
red 
ball 
skittle 
P(ball|green) = 0.9
P(ball|red) = 0.2
P(skittle|green) = 0.1
P(skittle|red) = 0.8
P(green|ball) = 0.9
P(green|skittle) = 0.1
P(red|ball) = 0.2
P(red|skittle) = 0.8
Sensory information = log
2
 2 - 0.8 =  0.2 bbits
green ball robot Given T=ball:  P(S=ball) = 0.83, P(S=skittle) = 0.17, H=0.68
Given T=skittle:  P(S=ball) = 0.34, P(S=skittle) = 0.66, H=0.92
Figure 6: Measurement of distal sensor information.
the launching of the ball in the forwards direction.
The figure presents a model of the sensing utilized and evaluates sensory
performance. The distal stimulus is taken to be the discriminated object. Pos-
sible values for T and S are thus ‘ball’ and ‘skittle’. All conditional relationships
are assumed to operate on a left-to-right basis, i.e., every dashed line has an
implicit arrow pointing to the right.8 Target and sensor are not directly linked,
however. The target influences the sensor via intermediate variable X , which is
the color of the object.
7The example is based on the Robosapiens 2 toy robot manufactured by Wowee Robotics.
8This applies to all the ensuing schematics.
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Inter-variable influences (conditional probabilities) are as indicated in the
upper part of the figure. These are also represented schematically using dashed
lines. For each conditional probability there is a line connecting the conditioned
value (on the right) to its conditioning value (on the left). Longer dashes indicate
higher probabilities. Thus the conditional probability of X=green given T=ball
is 0.9 (the connecting line uses a long dash) while the conditional probability of
X=red given T=ball is 0.2 (the connecting line uses a short dash). The general
situation is that balls are typically green and skittles typically red.
Applying forwards propagation, we can derive conditional probability distri-
butions for S and calculate the information obtained for any particular state of
the target. On that basis, we can measure sensory information. The steps in the
procedure are summarized in the lower part of the figure. The average entropy
for generated distributions on S is 0.8. Given that the maximum information
value for this variable is log2 2 = 1, we then obtain a sensory information of 0.2
bbits. This sensing scheme thus shows a level of efficiency precisely one fifth of
the optimum.
3.2 Example 2: Chrysopa septempunctata
The method can also be applied to models of natural sensory systems. For an
illustration, consider Figure 7. This depicts distal sensing in the Green Lacewing
T
no-threat
threat
FM
no
yes
PF
lo
hi
S
no-threat
threat
 FM=no  PF=lo
 FM=no  PF=hi
 FM=yes  PF=lo
 FM=yes  PF=hi
Sensory information
   = 0.5 bbits
FM
no
yes
PF
lo
hi
 FM=no  PF=lo
 FM=no  PF=hi
 FM=yes  PF=lo
 FM=yes  PF=hi
Sensory information
    = -0.213 bbits
T
no-threat
threat
S
no-threat
threat
Informative scheme
Misinformative scheme
Figure 7: Capture-threat sensing in the green lacewing moth.
moth Chrysopa septempunctata. These insects have evolved a remarkable tactic
for evading capture by predatory bats in the final stages of attack. Making
use of sensory information regarding the frequency of echolocation pulses and
the presence or absence of a frequency-modulation (FM) component in the call,
these creatures can detect the threat of imminent capture and ‘fold their wings
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and nosedive out of the sky’ (Smith, 2000, p. 81).
Figure 7 contrasts two sensing schemes for this response: an informative
scheme (upper, left) and a misinformative scheme (lower, right). Dashed lines
are used to represent probability as before. However, here, we have the com-
plication that values of the sensory variable are conditional on combinations of
intermediate values. To handle this schematically, nodes are introduced (the
small, filled circles) to represent combinations of intermediate values (shown
immediately to the left).
The target is threat of attack. This influences the sensor via two intermediate
variables, one of which (FM) is the presence or absence of an FM component in
the echolocation call, and the other of which (PF) is the frequency of emitted
pulses. Here and elsewhere ‘lo’ = low and ‘hi’ = high.9
Sensory information in the informative scheme is 0.5 bbits. (A listing of the
conditional probabilities used is given in Appendix 1.) In contrast, the misinfor-
mative scheme depicted in the lower, right part of the figure produces a negative
gain of -0.213 bbits, i.e., just under a third of a negative bbit. Intuitively, this is
because the FM=no, PF=hi combination is correctly associated with S=threat
in the informative structure but not in the misinformative structure.
3.3 Example 3: Electronic stability sensing
While the measurement framework can be applied to models of natural and
autonomous agents, it is not limited to that usage. It can be applied to any
Figure 8: Sensing for electronic stability control.
distal sensing scheme where the distal-to-proximal mapping can be modeled as
a Bayesian network. The framework can thus be applied to sensing schemes
used in non-autonomous systems.
Consider the electronic stability system of the modern motorcar. An evolu-
tion of the automatic braking systems (ABS) from the 1980s, these more recent
systems utilize multiple sensors and computer-controlled moderation of braking
9In reality, pulse frequency can range from 7 pulses per second to over 30 pulses.
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for purposes of skid-avoidance. In a simple case, a sensing system might make
use of inputs from a yaw sensor and wheel-speed sensors (cf. Figure 8) to con-
trol understeer — the process whereby a car fails to turn right or left due to
skidding forwards.
Figure 9 presents a model in which the target is taken to be the trajectory
of the vehicle. Possible values are ‘oversteer’, ‘understeer’ and ‘balanced’. In
T
YR
lo
hi
LA
lo
hi
WL
lo
hi
U
0
1
 LA=lo  
 WL=lo
SA
lo
hi
Q
0
1
S
 U=0 
 Q=0
Sensory information 
              = 0.996 bbits
Understeer
Oversteer
Balanced
Understeer
Oversteer
Balanced
 LA=lo  
 WL=hi
 LA=hi  
 WL=lo
 LA=hi  
 WL=hi
 U=0  
 Q=1
 U=1  
 Q=0
 U=1  
 Q=1
Figure 9: Informational model of an ES system.
this model, the target directly influences two intermediate variables: the current
steering angle and the yaw rate of the vehicle — the rate at which it is rotating
around its central point. The latter in turn influences lateral acceleration (side-
ways motion) and wheel-lock. There are then two further variables (U and Q)
which jointly influence the sensory variable.
Given the indicated conditional probabilities, the sensory information is
0.996 bbits, compared to a maximum of 1.538 bbits. The system exhibits a
relatively high level of efficiency. The example also illustrates that variables in
the distal-to-proximal mapping need not correspond to physical objects or objec-
tive properties of the agent’s environment. As in this case, they may correspond
to abstract properties of the agent, or to properties of the agent/environment
interaction.
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4 Achievement of sensory efficiency
Attention can now turn to the main question for the approach, namely What
properties of a distal sensing scheme most affect its informational efficiency?
For purposes of answering the question, a new type of variable is introduced.
Any variable which can be accessed but not influenced by the agent is now
defined to be a receptor variable. Receptor variables can thus be viewed as the
channels of proximal stimulation. By specifying a mapping between a target and
T S
receptor
variables
Z
Y
X
?
Figure 10: A distal sensing problem.
a set of receptor variables, it is then possible to define a distal sensing problem,
as in Figure 10. Finding the solution to such a problem involves determining
what structure of variables interposed between receptors (shaded boxes in this
and ensuing schematics) and sensor will yield maximum sensory information.
In terms of Figure 10, the arrangement to be determined is the one which
maximizes information on the basis of T ’s (indirect) influence on X , Y and Z.
What, then, are the factors influencing efficiency? To start, we focus on
the simple, direct-mapping scenario of Figure 11 (A). Here, target variable T
is itself defined to be a receptor. As we might expect, the configuration which
maximizes informational efficiency is then very simple. To maximize gain we
must ensure conditional probabilities are configured so that each distinct value
of the target is conditionally associated (with maximum probability) with its
counterpart in the sensor. This is the effect implemented by the 1-to-1 mapping.
Taking a small step in complexity brings us to scenario (B). Here we have
separate target and receptor variables and a conditional distribution in which
the upper value of the receptor variable (X) is associated equally strongly with
the two upper values of the target. For maximum sensory information, in this
case, conditional probabilities connecting the receptor to the sensor must be
configured in a specific way. If T ’s influence on X ensures that X has the
value X1 or X2 with equal probability whenever T has the value T1, we need to
configure conditional probabilities affecting S so thatX1 andX2 produce S = T1
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TST T S 
S
(A) (B)
(C) (D)
Y X
X 
T Y X W S
Figure 11: Simple sensing scenarios.
with equal probability. In general, we need conditional probabilities between X
and S to mirror those between T and X . Sensory information is maximized by
ensuring that S produces the best possible replication of the behavior of T ; this
is achieved by mirroring the relevant influences on any intermediate variable(s).
The situation stays essentially the same if we have a chain of intermediate
variables connecting target to sensor, as in schematics (C) and (D). Where the
receptor variable impacts the sensor directly (as it does in both these scenarios),
the final link in the chain (i.e., those influences which act directly on the sensor)
must be configured to mirror the influences acting on that variable. But in this
case it is the cumulative influences which are involved and the mirroring effect
may not be visually apparent, as exemplified in (D).
4.1 Optimization using inter-variable reversal
More challenging situations arise if we allow for the possibility of distribution
across variables, i.e., situations in which one variable influences more than one
child. The simplest case is depicted in the left-hand schematic of Figure 12. In
addition to the target and sensor, this scenario features two receptor variables,
both of which are directly influenced by the target. Information about the target
is distributed across the two intermediate variables. When taken in combination,
however, their values are mutually constraining with regard to their origin in
T .
The only possible situation which might lead to X = 1 and Y = 0 is T = 1.
Taking this into account allows the underlying value of T to be determined with
full confidence. Maximization of sensory information is achieved by making
S = 1 conditional on X = 1 and Y = 0 jointly. This is the effect achieved
in the illustrated configuration. The unbroken line connecting to S = 1 shows
this binding results with probability 1.0 if X = 1 and Y = 0. The other two
unbroken lines mirror other 1-to-1 correspondences.
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Figure 12: Perfect and imperfect reversal.
In this case we see how maximization of sensory information requires re-
versing the distributive effect applying to the value of T . This is similar to the
requirement in the case of intra-variable distribution. But here the distribution
operates across variables. Reversing it requires use of a correctly configured
multi-parented variable — an encapsulative variable as it will be called. The
conditional probabilities for this must be such as to capture and exploit the
mutual constraints created in the distribution.
In sum, reversing distributive effects where multiple variables are involved
involves use of matching encapsulative variables whose conditional relationships
mirror the associations which produced the distribution. We need the distribu-
tive ‘fan out’ to be mirrored by the encapsulative ‘fan in’. If there is no encap-
sulative variable, or if the conditional relationships do not produce the required
reversal, sensory information is degraded. As an illustration consider the right-
hand schematic of Figure 12. This is a version of the scheme depicted on the left
but using non-reversing conditional probabilities. The result is an information
value well below the optimum of 1.58 bbits.
4.2 The reversal principle
Distal sensing tasks can vary in several ways. But formalized in terms of tar-
get/sensor/receptor variables they can be analyzed in a way that reveals the
requirements for informational efficiency. The general principles of optimization
then come to light. Where the scenario exhibits perfect 1-to-1 correspondences
between target and receptor values, as in Figure 11 (A), the sensory task is
trivial. But where there is distribution of target values across receptor values,
e.g., Figure 11 (B, C and D), the latter cannot unambiguously identify the for-
mer. Rather they identify them probabilistically and in this case, optimization
is achieved by ensuring all intra-variable, distributive effects are fully reversed.
Where these is divergence in pre-receptor influences, we have distribution
of information across multiple variables. Implicit, mutual constraints are then
possible, in which case optimization involves another kind of reversal. Here
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it is the inter-variable distributive effects which must be reversed through the
medium of encapsulation. The principle for optimizing sensor gain is thus to
ensure that all distributive effects are properly reversed. Stated more precisely,
distal sensory information is maximized when there is matching re-
versal for all distributive effects
This is the reversal principle for distal sensing. Contained within it is a
structural requirement. Where distributive effects operate across variables, it
is essential that encapsulative variables have access to (i.e., are influenced by)
relevant source variables. This means the encapsulative sub-structure must be
reversely isomorphic with the distributive sub-structure. A structural corre-
spondence is entailed. This does not mean there has to be a ‘visual match’
between the two parts of the configuration, however. It only means those as-
pects of the structure which have distributive properties must be matched by
variables with corresponding encapsulative properties.
5 Encapsulation viewed as representation
The technical content of the paper has now been set out. Sensory information
relating to a distal stimulus has been shown to be measurable using Bayesian-
network models of distal-to-proximal structure. The achievement of sensory
efficiency has been shown to depend on the degree to which distributive effects
are properly reversed. The general conclusion is that sensory schemes must
exhibit reversal in order to be informationally efficient.
While informational analysis of sensing has a long tradition, (e.g., Barlow,
1961; van Hateren, 1992; Tononi et al. 1994; Tononi et al. 1996; Pfeifer and
Scheier, 1999; Lungarella and Pfeifer, 2001; Hillis et al. 2002), previous ap-
proaches have not probed the distal dimension of the process in the way the
present framework does. For purposes of sensory engineering, it has the advan-
tage of formally accommodating the informational ramifications of environmen-
tal structure. But the more relevant benefit, for present purposes, is located in
its cognitive implications. These emerge from a consideration of the representa-
tional properties of encapsulative structure.
At an abstract level, encapsulation may be viewed as the extraction of a par-
ticular invariant. Indeed, it is the defining property of an encapsulative variable
to reproduce that invariant value of the parent from which the distributed pat-
tern emerges. This has implications for the way we interpret the function of
such variables. Where one encapsulative variable operates under the influence
of the values of some other encapsulative variable (cf. Figure 9), reversal is
fulfilled specifically on the basis that the latter properly reproduces values of
the distributive counterpart. Values of the utilized encapsulative variable then
play the role of informational surrogates within the scheme. A reversing en-
capsulative structure fulfilling a sensory function is constituted of encapsulative
variables which the scheme itself treats as informational surrogates for distribu-
tive variables.
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Consider Figure 13. In this scenario, the target is taken to be a certain prop-
erty of a surface, namely its ability to provide the sensory agent with ‘support’.
(The possible values are taken to be ‘supports’, ‘flexes’ and ‘gives-way’.) Sensing
is mediated by three receptor variables. The first is the behavior of the agent,
assumed to be either ‘mob’ (mobile) or ‘sta’ (static). The second is relative size
(‘rel-size’), i.e., the size of the agent relative to the surface, with possible values
being ‘sma’ (small) and ‘lrg’ (large). The third is relative extension (‘rel-extn’),
i.e,. extension of the surface relative to the agent, with possible values ‘hor’
(horizontal) and ‘ ver ’ (vertical).10
T
supports
gives-way
behavior
mob
sta
rel-size
sma
lrg
rel-extn
hor
ver
 mob,sma,hor
 mob,sma,ver 
 mob,lrg,hor
 mob,lrg,ver
 sta,sma,hor
 sta,sma,ver
 sta,lrg,hor
 sta,lrg,ver
Sensory information 
      = 1.02 bbits
S
supports
gives-way
flexes flexes
Figure 13: Encapsulative surrogacies.
Sensor S provides perfect reversing encapsulation with regard to T . Sen-
sory information is 1.02 bbits and S can legitimately be viewed as a vehicle
for reproducing values of T . Were it to feature in any further encapsulative
structure, it would then play the role of an information surrogate for that prop-
erty. In this case, the encapsulative variable serves as a proxy for a property of
agent/environment interaction. But there is also the potential for surrogacies
to bridge the agent/environment divide altogether. In a case where the target
can be viewed as being exclusively part of the environment, the encapsulative
variable then forms form an internal surrogate for an external entity.
Serving to link properties, features and entities of both agent and environ-
ment, a hierarchy of encapsulative variables forms a structure of surrogacies
10The example is loosely based on Gibson’s supporting surface example (Gibson, 1979, p.
127).
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whose efficient operation depends on its mediation of representational activity.
An encapsulative structure is thus a kind of representational structure. But
what kind exactly? On a number of counts, it departs from the familiar case of
classical, symbolic representation. In particular,
• There is no computer: the representational structure does not presup-
pose the functioning of any kind of supervisory computational process.
• There is no symbol processing: the representational structure is not
mediated by sequential processing of any form.
• There is no world model: the structure is not defined in terms of any
‘external’ universe.
• There is no reasoner: the system does not perform any kind of inference
or deduction.
• There is no encoding: the representational structure is not stated or
encoded in any kind of language.
• There is no subject-object distinction: encapsulative structure im-
plies no particular division between agent and environment.
The type of representational activity emerging from the analysis thus differs
in a range of ways from those familiar forms based on symbolic encoding, class
hierarchies and relational databases (Brachman and Levesque, 1985). On the
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Figure 14: Encapsulative mediation of class subsumption.
other hand, being grounded in the formalism of Bayesian networks,11 it has the
power to model applications which feature in those forms. Consider the case of
the generalization hierarchy. This representational construct can be modeled by
11As probabilistic graph models, Bayesian nets can model any dynamical or computational
system.
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an encapsulative structure through the expedient of letting multiple surrogacies
implement class subsumption. Figure 15 illustrates how this might work in a
class hierarchy for animals.
In this model, target T is an object classified either as ‘animal’ or ‘non-
animal’. Variable S is the sensor while f1, f2, f3 and f4 are receptors. Perfect
reversal is achieved through the medium of matching encapsulative to distribu-
tive structure as usual. This also guarantees that the class-containment relations
shaping the distributive structure are reproduced in encapsulative relations. An
implicit model of class-subsumption is thus obtained.
Encapsulative representation can also model symbol-processing applications
where conclusions are derived though reasoning. In such cases, the encapsulative
system must use surrogacies to model relations, and propagation to model infer-
ence. Figure 15 illustrates the effect in an example involving kinship relations.
mother(mary, sue).
mother(mary, david).
mother(jill, john).
husband(bob, mary).
husband(jack, jill).
father(bob, X) ? 
X = sue
X = david
husband
bob
jack
mother
mary
jill
sue
david
john
T
father
bob
jack
S
child
father(F, C) 
husband(F, W)    mother(W, C)     
V
Figure 15: Encapsulative mediation of symbolic logic.
In the lower part of the figure, we see a traditional, deductive framework for
the kinship domain made up of some facts, e.g., mother(mary, sue), and a rule
which allows a ‘father’ relationship to be deduced on the basis of a ‘mother’ and
a ‘wife’ relation. Use of this rule enables us to determine that ‘bob’ is the father
of the two individuals ‘sue’ and ‘david’.
In the upper part of the figure we see how this inferential activity might be
modeled by a distributive/encapsulative structure. The identify of the father is
here treated as variable S, i.e., as proxy for the identity of the husband. Given
the evaluation husband=bob, propagation of values will correctly instantiate S,
while giving equal probability to child=sue and child=david. The encapsulative
structure mimics the behavior of the rule system in using the husband/mother
dependencies for purposes of instantiating the ‘father’ variable. The inferential
effect is then captured in the giving of equal probability to ‘sue’ and ‘david’ as
the mediating value of ‘child’.
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6 Related representation concepts
While the notion of representation emerging from the analysis differs in vari-
ous respects from GOFAI encoding, it has features in common with some of
the novel, non-symbolic conceptions of representation being explored in embed-
ded/embodied approaches. Such approaches tend to move away from traditional
notions of symbol processing (e.g., Fodor, 1975; Newell and Simon, 1976; Newell
and Simon, 1972; Pylyshyn, 1987), towards conceptions of representation which
emphasize surrogacy, sensory embedding and system-functional content.12
Consider, for example, the view of Harnad (1990). His non-symbolic con-
cept of representation explicitly stressed the idea of constructs being sensorily
grounded. He suggested ‘the symbolic functions would emerge ... as a conse-
quence of the bottom-up grounding of categories’ names in their sensory repre-
sentations.’ (Harnad, 1990, p. 335)
From the same era, Haugeland’s definition of representation placed strong
emphasis on surrogacy relations.
‘We will reserve the term ‘representation’ for those stand-ins that
function in virtue of a general representational scheme such that: (a),
a variety of possible contents can be represented by a corresponding
variety of possible representations; (b) what any given representation
(item, pattern, state, event, etc.) represents is determined in some
consistent or systematic way by the scheme; and (c) there are proper
(and improper) ways of producing, maintaining, modifying, and/or
using the various representations under various environmental and
other conditions.’ (Haugeland, 1991, p. 62)
Also emphasizing the fundamental nature of surrogacy is the definition from
(Haselager et al. 2003). This defines an internal representation as ‘an identifi-
able inner state within a system that stands in for another (internal or external)
state and that as such plays a causal role for (or is used by) the system gen-
erating its behavior’ (Haselager et al. 2003), cf. (Smith, 1996). Clark has
also stressed the representational significance of ‘inner surrogates’ in a range of
publications (Clark and Toribio, 1994; Clark, 1996; Clark and Thornton, 1997;
Wheeler and Clark, 1999; Clark, 1997; Clark and Grush, 1999; Clark, 2003;
Clark, 2008). Clark and Toribio’s early framing of the ‘representation-hungry
domain’ (Clark and Toribio, 1994, p. 31) treated sensorily-embedded represen-
tation as one of two significant cases, the other being more akin to symbolic
representation. But recently Clark and others have gone further in stressing the
specifically ‘sensory’ case. Indeed, Clark has more recently abandoned ‘the idea
of an executive center where the brain carries out high-level reasoning (Clark,
1997, p. xiii), which would seem to prioritize the ‘sensory’ part of the original
definition.
12In Clark and Grush’s view (1999, p. 9), the move is towards notions which ‘tie the
idea of internal representations to ideas involving tracking the distal, the absent, and the
non-existent.’
21
Clark’s work also moves deliberately away from conceptions of complete and
consistent world models. In their stead, Clark envisages a ‘large but fragmen-
tary suite of internal representations’ (Clark, 2008, p. 146), embedded struc-
tures which serve to ‘refocus’ domains of engagement. Such structures are often
envisaged to be characteristically sensory in nature. Frequently cited, for ex-
ample, is the case of emulator circuits (Clark and Grush, 1999; Kawato et al.
1987; Dean et al. 1994). These are mechanisms which ‘replicate certain aspects
of the temporal dynamics of the larger systems’ (Clark, 1997, p. 23) but whose
representational value is seen as originating in the way they mediate surrogacies
constitutive of virtual sensory feedback (Clark and Grush, 1999; Grush, 2004).13
Concepts of sensorily-embedded representation steer clear of the subject-
object distinction which plagues classical symbolic representation (Varella et al.
1991; Bickhard and Terveen, 1995). They are better able to accommodate an
enactive or ecological view, in which representational content is associated with
the possibilities of agent/environment interaction (Noe¨, 2004). In Bickhard and
Terveen’s ‘interactivist’ proposal (Bickhard and Terveen, 1995), for example,
‘an encoding’s having representational content is a property of the functional
usage of the encoding by the system — it is a property of the system knowing
what the encoding is supposed to represent — and not a property of the encoding
element itself’ (p. 57, original emphasis). This is also strongly emphasized in
encapsulative representation, where it is the functional usage of a value which
fixes its content. Bickhard and Terveen also stress the role of misinformation,
treating it as a requirement that a representation must ‘involve some sense of
use that can be wrong, and representation must be capable of being wrong for
the system itself’ (Bickhard and Terveen, 1995, p. 57). Again this is reflected
in encapsulative representation, where variable evaluations can be ‘wrong’ (i.e.,
misinformative) for the embedding sensory scheme.
Many other researchers are developing notions of representation which em-
phasize surrogacy, sensory-embedding and system-functional content. Barsalou,
for example, emphasizes all three factors in a framework which draws together
cognition with perception.14 His theory of ‘perceptual symbol systems’ (Barsa-
lou, 1999) aims to ‘demonstrate that it is possible to ground a fully functional
conceptual system in sensory-motor mechanisms’ (Barsalou, 1999, p. 608). In
a similar vein, Prinz has developed a notion of conceptual representation built
around ‘proxytypes’ (Prinz, 2002). The central idea here is that ‘concepts are in-
ternally structured detection mechanisms’ (Prinz, 2002, p. 125). In other words,
Prinz proposes that internal representations of concepts can be understood in
quasi-sensory terms. Also significant for the way they explore the connection
between sensing and representation are the approaches of Ga¨rdenfors (2000),
Hesslow (2002) and Grush (2004).
13Hesslow, on the other hand, adopts an anti-representational position in advancing a similar
proposal (Hesslow, 2002).
14Like Gibson (1979), Barsalou seems to have a radical application of Occam’s Razor in
mind with regard to notions of cognitive ‘level’. In his view ‘where we actually draw the
line between perception and cognition may not be all that important, useful or meaningful,’
(Barsalou, 1999, p. 589).
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7 Explanatory implications
The concept of ‘representational activity’ emerging from the analysis dispenses
with many of the commitments of classical, symbolic representation, includ-
ing the computer, the world model, the reasoner, the encoding and the sub-
ject/object distinction. Like several of the embedded/embodied approaches
cited, it emphasizes surrogacy, sensory embedding and system-functional con-
tent. Unlike them, it relies on theoretical task analysis rather than on analysis
of empirical evidence. Does this make any difference to the explanatory account
engendered? There are in fact a few points of detail where task-based analysis
can serve to focus or extend empirically-based explanation.
What is representation?
The difficulties involved in answering this key, ontological question are well
documented (Dreyfus, 1979; Searle, 1980). For some, any account constructed
in terms of the concept of symbolic encoding is tautological (Bateson, 2000).
Others identify an intrinsic circularity in the practice of symbolic representa-
tion which means the question cannot be coherently answered in that context
(Harnad, 1990; Stewart, 1995). Bickhard and Terveen note there is no way in
this paradigm (they call it ‘encodingism’) that ‘representation can emerge out
of phenomena that are not themselves already representational’ (Bickhard and
Terveen, 1995, p. 76). On that basis, there is no way of accounting for what
representation really is in terms of description languages and symbolic encoding.
To the extent that approaches adopting an embedded/embodied perspective
do away with such commitments, they promise to surmount problems of circu-
larity. But the task analysis confirms this does not necessitate throwing out the
concept of ‘symbol’ altogether. Rather it meshes with the idea that symbols
may emerge as functional constructs. Clancey expresses it nicely when he notes
(Clancey, 1997) that as a result of the ‘complex interplay between ... inside and
outside ... classification couplings may come to function as symbols in infer-
ential reasoning’ (p. 11). His emphasis that the interplay operates at ‘many
levels of organization simultaneously’ (p. 75) further echoes the functionality of
encapsulative representation. In terms of this functional conception of what a
symbol really is, representation may continue to be seen as symbol-mediated.15
The task analysis meshes equally well with Clark and Grush’s conception
of representation. In (Clark and Grush, 1999), ‘fullblooded internal represen-
tation’ is defined to be ‘specific states and/or processes whose functional role
is to act as de-coupleable surrogates for specifiable (usually extra-neural) states
of affairs’ (Clark and Grush, 1999, p. 8). Rather than being imposed from
the ‘outside’, symbols are envisaged as emerging as functional entities within
the system. The sense of symbol-usage arising from the task analysis is simi-
lar. It also accommodates situations where distributive effects are grounded in
agent/environment interaction. This is particularly illustrated in the model of
15As Clancey comments, ‘researchers who held tenaciously to the idea of symbols in the
brain were justified in doing so, but the physical nature, development, and reconstructive
aspect of those symbol systems is quite unlike the labels and their manipulation in descriptive
models.’ (Clancey, 1997, p. 11).
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electronic stability sensing (Figure 9), where several of the variables are both
dynamic and interactive. The task-based account may thus promote greater
compatibility with neurological evidence suggestive of a tight linkage between
category symbolization and action representation, cf. the emerging evidence on
bimodal and mirror neurons (e.g., Gallese and Goldman, 1998, Rizzolati et al.
2001; Maravita and Iriki, 2004).
What is representation for?
The classical, symbolic view promotes the idea that the purpose of repre-
sentation is to provide an internal locus of contingencies relating to external
entities and events. Non-classical approaches, in contrast, tend to view rep-
resentational structure as embedded within other types of processing and have
the potential to identify the purpose of representation with non-representational
function. Clark and Grush, for example, see representation emerging in ‘emu-
lator circuits’, where the immediate goal is the provision (through simulation)
of the rapid sensory feedback which is vital for smooth motor-control. The
purpose of representation in that context can be viewed as the improvement of
‘real-world, real-time responsiveness’ (Clark and Grush, 1999, p. 7). Contrast
this with the task-analytic answer to the question, which is that the purpose
of representation can be seen as gain of information. Though different, the two
answers are not incompatible, however.
Introduction of encapsulative structure for purposes of information-gain may
be seen as a way of dealing with the information losses which result from dis-
tributive effects. Encapsulative representation may then be viewed as a means
of recovering information losses embodied in the distal-to-proximal mapping.
The effective aim is then to establish a tight, informational linkage with distal
stimulation, i.e., to establish what Clark and Grush term ‘real-world, real-time
responsiveness’. Their view of what representation is for thus chimes reasonably
well with that emerging from the task analysis.
What the analysis can add, however, is a formal notion of how the strategy
of linkage-making (through representation) can be traded-off with the strategy
which eliminates the information-losing ‘separation’. Figure 16 provides a simple
illustration. At the top of the figure, we have a distal sensing scheme embodying
a single intermediate variable. The distributive (i.e., ‘mixed-up’) nature of the
target’s influence on this variable produces an information loss which intra-
variable reversal cannot fully remedy. Contrasting the sensor gain of 0.161
bbits with the maximum of log2(3) = 1.58 bbits, the size of this loss can be
measured at 1.42 bbits.
In the lower part of the figure we then see schemes representing alternative
ways in which the loss can be dealt with. In the scheme on the left, the loss is
eliminated by the expedient of removing the distributive structure altogether.
Target T becomes a receptor, enabling conditional relationships to connect val-
ues of T directly with the appropriate values of S. Sensor and target are brought
into a closely connected relationship, effectively providing proximal access to the
distal stimulus.
In the scheme on the right, an encapsulative variable is introduced along with
an additional intermediate variable. Exploiting constraints operating across the
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Figure 16: Recovery of lost information through encapsulation.
two intermediate variables, this then provides the means of recovering the lost
information, with the achieved level of performance coming close to that of the
closely coupled system.
The example illustrates how introduction of encapsulation can be the means
of recovering lost information. It also illustrates the complementarity between
representation-use and coupling. Again, this meshes with Clark and Grush
(1999), who note that representation-use can be understood as a vehicle of
de-coupling. The specific implication arising from the task analysis, however,
is that the representation/coupling relationship takes the form of a tradeoff.
Where distal-to-proximal seperation engenders loss of information, the deficit
may be resolved either by information recovery (by use of representation) or
through elimination of the seperation. Relatively greater use of one strategy
allows for relatively less of the other.
How can representation be acquired?
On the classical, symbolic view, the acquisition of representational struc-
ture seems to necessitate a logically prior step involving the acquisition of the
language which gives meaning to symbols (Ga¨rdenfors, 2000, pp. 37-40). Non-
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classical approaches dispense with the prior requirement for an encoding lan-
guage, replacing it with a requirement for whatever is prerequisite for execution
of the function in which representation is embedded. This might mean acqui-
sition of real-time sensory functionality of some sort. But the task-analytic
suggestion is that acquisition of representation ultimately entails discovery of
those invariant properties which underlie salient distributive effects.
This process might proceed on the basis of the detection of mutual-information
between sensory streams, as envisaged by (Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999), or on the
basis of information self-structuring (Lungarella and Sporns, 2005), or on the
basis of some kind of information pickup, such as the ‘atunement’ operation
envisaged by Gibson (1979). Indeed, the process Gibson envisages seems par-
ticularly relevant to discovery of invariants underlying distributive effects. He
defines ‘atunement’ as the ‘registering of certain definite dimensions of invari-
ance in the stimulus flux along with definite parameters of disturbance.’ (Gib-
son, 1979, p. 249) He also conceptualizes the nature of those invariances in a
way which is compatible with their being informational. As he notes ‘Mathe-
matical complexities of stimulus energy seem to be the simplicities of stimulus
information.’ (Gibson, 1966, p. 319)
When is representation unnecessary?
Just as the symbolic view encounters circularities in explaining why rep-
resentation is necessary, so it suffers problems in accounting for those scenar-
ios where representation is clearly unnecessary (e.g., Brooks, 1986; Maes and
Brooks, 1990; Beer, 1990; Pfeifer and Scheier, 1997). A well-known illustra-
tion of such a scenario is the cross-connected version of Braitenberg’s ‘vehicle 2’
robot (Braitenberg, 1984): see schematic (b) in Figure 16. This robot executes
a robust pursuit behavior with regard to a sensory target.
a b
+
+
+
+
Figure 17: Braitenberg’s vehicle 2 architectures (Braitenberg, 1984, p.8).
The target is taken to directly stimulate the robot’s two receptors with an
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intensity that is proportional to distance, and with a differential value that de-
pends on orientation. With stimulation to each receptor transmitted to the
wheel motor on the opposite side of the robot, a sensory-motor linkage is ob-
tained whereby the robot always turns/moves towards the source of stimulation.
The symbolic view of representation seems to suggest no particular explanation
as to why this robust behavior is achievable without use of representational
structure. But the task-analytic view is more specific: representation is not
required in this scenario because there is no loss of sensory information.
Sensing in this context can be understood to involve the impact on two re-
ceptors produced by two variables, namely ‘leftside-stimulation’ and ‘rightside-
stimulation’. With this 1-to-1 mapping, there is no distributive structure in the
environment and no information loss. Recovery of information is not required.
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Figure 18: Encapsulative devices from (Braitenberg, 1984).
In his vehicle 2 architecture, Braitenberg pursues a minimalist style of im-
plementation. What makes the architecture interesting for present purposes,
however, is the fact that it represents an extreme point on the representa-
tion/coupling tradeoff. Behavioral efficacy is achieved solely on the basis of
coupling. Representation plays no role. However, it is easy to envisage how a
small adjustment in the representation/coupling balance might be made.
On the present analysis, any representation-increasing (coupling-reducing)
adjustment must involve introduction of some element of encapsulative struc-
ture. We can think of this in terms of a simple distributive/encapsulative scheme
(along the lines of Figure 7 or Figure 12) being interposed between sensors and
motors. But we can also make use of Braitenberg’s own proposals. In his ‘brand
5 vehicles’ (p. 20-25) use is made of what Braitenberg calls ‘threshold devices’,
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see Figure 18.16 While these operate in the manner of simple artificial neurons,
the fact that they set their state according to a combinational property of their
inputs means they can be interpreted as encapsulative variables. Braitenberg
shows how their use can be the basis of sensitivity to a range of distal stimuli
including ‘an olive green vehicle that buzzes at a certain frequency and never
moves faster than 5m/sec’ (p. 22). This is the effect we expect the introduction
of encapsulative representational structure to have.
In his Vehicle 8 designs, Braitenberg explores how complex networks of en-
capsulative structures — e.g., the object detector of Figure 18 — can serve to
provide the basis for detection of spatially-organized distal stimuli, i.e., locations
in a map. These examples illustrate how the simple distributive/encapsulative
schemes considered in the present paper might scale-up. They highlight some
of the ways in which the assembly of encapsulative structure into complexes can
be the basis for scene recognition and visual interpretation. In sum, they illus-
trate how a primitive information-recovery mechanism, when combined, cross-
connected and cascaded in the right ways, can serve to provide the forms of
recognizably symbolic representation with which we are most familiar.
8 Concluding comment
It is now more than 20 years since Brooks proposed that representation-use can
create an ‘information bottleneck’ in sensory-motor systems (Brooks, 1986). His
thesis surely remains correct with regard to the usage he envisaged, i.e., mod-
ular programs mediating multi-stage cross-referencing between world models
and sequential processing streams. That approach, however, was essentially a
wholesale import from computer science, a field with very different concerns.17
Notions of representation-use have now moved on in significant ways.
Guided by novel, non-symbolic conceptions, researchers are beginning to
uncover forms of sensorily-embedded representation which rely on intercon-
nected surrogacies and system-functional content. The present paper shows,
on purely theoretical grounds, why we should expect utilization of such forms
to be widespread in nature. They are the means of achieving efficiency in distal
sensing and are therefore likely to be critical for interpretive function. Brooks
was right to say that representation-usage has significant informational conse-
quences but he may have been wrong in describing what those consequences are.
Rather than serving to obstruct information, representations are better seen as
the means of regenerating or recovering it.
9 Appendix 1
16The threshold device is the central elements in Braitenberg’s Figure 9. The object detector
forms Figure 12.
17Stand-alone representational structures have well understood advantages in computer sci-
ence (Sedgewick, 1988).
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Conditional probabilities for green lacewing moth models
Receptor values Informative sensor Misinformative sensor
P(FM=0|T=0) = 0.1
P(FM=1|T=0) = 0.9
P(FM=0|T=1) = 0.9
P(FM=1|T=1) = 0.1
P(PF=0|T=0) = 0.9
P(PF=1|T=0) = 0.1
P(PF=0|T=1) = 0.1
P(PF=1|T=1) = 0.9
P(S=0|FM=0,PF=0) = 0.5
P(S=1|FM=0,PF=0) = 0.5
P(S=0|FM=0,PF=1) = 0.02
P(S=1|FM=0,PF=1) = 0.98
P(S=0|FM=1,PF=0) = 0.98
P(S=1|FM=1,PF=0) = 0.02
P(S=0|FM=1,PF=1) = 0.5
P(S=1|FM=1,PF=1) = 0.5
P(S=0|FM=0,PF=0) = 0.5
P(S=1|FM=0,PF=0) = 0.5
P(S=0|FM=0,PF=1) = 0.84
P(S=1|FM=0,PF=1) = 0.16
P(S=0|FM=1,PF=0) = 0.16
P(S=1|FM=1,PF=0) = 0.84
P(S=0|FM=1,PF=1) = 0.5
P(S=1|FM=1,PF=1) = 0.5
References
Ballard, D. (1991). Animate vision. Artificial Intelligence, 48 (pp. 57-86).
Barlow, H. (1961). Possible principles underlying the transformation of sensory
messages. In W.A. Rosenblith (Ed.), Sensory communication (pp. 217-234).
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Barsalou, L. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sci-
ences, 22 (pp. 577-660).
Bateson, G. (2000). Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Beer, R. (1990). Intelligence as Adaptive Behaviour: An Experiment in Com-
putational Neuroethology. San Diego: Academic Press.
Beer, R. (2003). The dynamics of active categorical perception in an evolved
model agent. Adaptive Behavior, 11, No. 4 (pp. 209-243).
Bickhard, M. and Terveen, L. (1995). Foundational Issues in Artificial Intel-
ligence and Cognitive Science: Impasse and Solution. New York: Elsevier
Science.
Brachman, R. and Levesque, H. (Eds.) (1985). Readings in Knowledge Repre-
sentation. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann.
Braitenberg, V. (1984). Vehicles: Experiments in Synthetic Psychology. Lon-
don: The MIT Press.
Brignell, J. and White, N. (1994). Intelligent Sensor Systems. Bristol: IOP
Publishing Ltd.
Brooks, R. (1986). A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE
Journal of Robotics and Automation, RA-2, No. 1 (pp. 14-23).
29
Brooks, R. (1991a). Intelligence without reason. In J. Mylopoulos and R. Reiter
(Eds.), Proceedings of the Twelth International Joint Conference on Artifi-
cial Intelligence (pp. 569-595). San Mateo, California: Morgan Kaufman.
Brooks, R. (1991b). Intelligence without representation. Artificial Intelligence,
47 (pp. 139-159).
Clancey, W. (1997). Situated Cognition: On Human Knowledge and Computer
Representations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Clark, A. (1996). Happy couplings: emergence and explanatory interlock. In
M.A. Boden (Ed.), The Philosophy of Artificial Life (pp. 262-281). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Clark, A. (1997). Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Clark, A. (2003). Natural Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies and the Future
of Human Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
Clark, A. (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive
Extension. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clark, A. and Grush, R. (1999). Towards a cognitive robotics. Adaptive Behav-
ior, 7, No. 1 (pp. 5-16).
Clark, A. and Thornton, C. (1997). Trading spaces: computation, representa-
tion and the limits of uninformed learning. Behaviour and Brain Sciences,
20 (pp. 57-90). Cambridge University Press.
Clark, A. and Toribio, J. (1994). Doing without representing. Synthese, 101
(pp. 401-431).
Cover, T. and Thomas, J. (1991). Elements of Information Theory. Hoboken,
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Dean, P., Mayhew, J. and Langdon, P. (1994). Learning and maintaining sac-
cadic accuracy: a model of brainstem-cerebellum interactions. Jounral of
Cognitive Neuroscience, 6 (pp. 117-138).
Dreyfus, H. (1979). What Computers Cant´ Do (revised edition). New York:
Harper and Row.
Fodor, J. (1975). The Language of Thought. New York: Crowell.
Gallese, V. and Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simulation theory
of mind-reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2, No. 12 (pp. 493-501).
Ga¨rdenfors, P. (2000). Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
30
Gibson, J. (1966). The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Oxford,
England: Houghton-Miﬄin.
Gibson, J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston:
Houghton Miffin.
Grush, R. (2004). The emulation theory of representation. Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 27 (pp. 377-442).
Harnad, S. (1990). The symbol grounding problem. Physica D, 42 (pp. 335-
346).
Haselager, P., de Groot, A. and van Rappard, H. (2003). Representationalism
vs. anti-representationalism: a debate for the sake of appearance. Philo-
sophical Psychology, 16 (pp. 5-23).
Haugeland, J. (1991). Representational genera. In W. Ramsay, S.P. Stich and
D.E. Rumelhart (Eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory (pp. 61-89).
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Hesslow, G. (2002). Conscious thought as simulation of behaviour and percep-
tion. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6 (pp. 242-247).
Hillis, J., Ernst, M., Banks, M. and Landy, M. (2002). Combining sensory
information: mandatory fusion within, but not between, senses. Science,
298 (pp. 1627-1630).
Kawato, M., Furukawa, K. and Suzuki, R. (1987). A hierarchical neural net-
work model for the control and learning of voluntary movement. Biological
Cybernetics, 57 (pp. 169-185).
Kirsh, D. (1996). Today the earwig, tomorrow man?. In M.A. Boden (Ed.),
The Philosophy of Artificial Life (pp. 237-261). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Korb, K. and Nicholson, A. (2003). Bayesian Artificial Intelligence. Boca
Raton, Florida: CRC Press.
Kullback, S. (1987). The kullback-leibler distance. The American Statistician,
41 (pp. 340-341).
Laming, D. (1986). Sensory Analysis. London: Academic Press.
Lungarella, M., Pegors, T., Bulwinkle, D. and Sporns, O. (2005). Methods for
quantifying the information structure of sensory and motor data. Neuro-
informatics, 3, No. 3 (pp. 243-2620).
Lungarella, M. and Pfeifer, R. (2001). Robots as cognitive tools: information
theoretic analysis of sensory-motor data. Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE-RAS
International Conference on Humanoid Robots (pp. 245-252). Piscataway,
NJ: IEEE Press.
31
Lungarella, M. and Sporns, O. (2005). Information self-structuring: key princi-
ples for learning and development. Proceedings 2005 4th IEEE International
Conference on Development and Learning and Learning (pp. 25-30).
Maes, P. and Brooks, R. (1990). Learning to coordinate behaviors. Proceedings
of the Eighth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 796-802).
San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.
Maravita, A. and Iriki, A. (2004). Tools for the body (schema). Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 8, No. 2 (pp. 79-86).
Marr, D. (1982). Vision. New York: W.H. Freeman.
Mather, P. (1999). Computer Processing of Remotely-Sensed Images. Chich-
ester, England: John Wiley and Sons Ltd.
Newell, A. and Simon, H. (1972). Human Problem Solving. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Newell, A. and Simon, H. (1976). Computer science as empirical inquiry: sym-
bols and search. Communications of the ACM, 19, No. 3 (pp. 113-126).
Noe¨, A. (2004). Action in Perception. London, England: The MIT Press.
Pearl, J. (1985). Bayesian networks: a model of self-activated memory for
evidential reasoning. Proceedings of the 7th Conference of the Cognitive
Science Society (pp. 329-334). Irvine, CA: University of California, Irvine,
CA.
Pearl, J. (2000). Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press.
Pfeifer, R. and Scheier, C. (1997). Sensory-motor coordination: the metaphor
and beyond. practice and future of autonomous agents. Robotics and Au-
tonomous Systems, 20 (pp. 157-178).
Pfeifer, R. and Scheier, C. (1999). Understanding Intelligence. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Prinz, J. (2002). Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and their Perceptual Basis.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pylyshyn, Z. (1987). The Robots Dilemma: The Frame Problem in Artificial
Intelligence. Norwood: Ablex.
Rizzolati, G., Forgassi, L. and Gallese, V. (2001). Neurophysiological mech-
anisms underlying the understanding and imitation of action. Nature Re-
views: Neuroscience, 2 (pp. 661-670).
Sabins, F. (1978). Remote Sensing: Principles and Interpretation. New York:
W.H. Freeman and Company.
32
Searle, J. (1980). Minds, brains and programs [with peer commentaries]. Be-
havioural and Brain Sciences, 3 (pp. 417-57).
Sedgewick, R. (1988). Algorithmics (2nd edition). Menlo Park, California:
Addison-Wesley Publising Company, Inc.
Shannon, C. (1948). A mathematical theory of communication. Bell System
Technical Journal, 27 (pp. 379-423 and 623-656).
Shannon, C. and Weaver, W. (1949). The Mathematical Theory of Communi-
cation. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.
Smith, B. (1996). On the Origin of Objects. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Smith, C. (2000). Biology of Sensory Systems. New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Ltd.
Stewart, J. (1995). Cognition = life: implications for higher-level cognition.
Behavioural Processes, 35 (pp. 311-326).
Svensson, H. and Ziemke, T. (2005). Embodied representation: what are the
issues?. In B.G. Bara, L. Barsalou and M. Bucciarelli (Eds.), Proceedings
of the 27th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 2116-
2121). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Tononi, G., Sporns, O. and Edelman, G. (1994). A measure for brain complex-
ity: relating functional segregation and integration in the nervous system.
Proceedings of the Nat. Academy of Science, 91 (pp. 5033-5037).
Tononi, G., Sporns, O. and Edelman, G. (1996). A complexity measure for
selective matching of signals by the brain. Proceedings of the Nat. Academy
of Science, 93 (pp. 3422-3427).
Usher, M. and Keating, D. (1996). Sensors and Transducers: Characteristics,
Applications, Instrumentation, Interfacing. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
van Gelder, T. (1995). What might cognition be, if not computation. Journal
of Philosophy, XCII, No. 7 (pp. 345-381).
van Hateren, J. (1992). A theory of maximizing sensory information. Biological
Cybernetics, 68, No. 1 (pp. 23-29). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer.
Varella, F., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cogni-
tive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT
Press.
Webster, J. (1999). The Measurement, Instrumentation and Sensors Handbook.
Danvers, MA: CRC Press LLC.
Wheeler, M. (1996). From robots to rothko: the bringing forth of worlds. In
M.A. Boden (Ed.), The Philosophy of Artificial Life (pp. 209-236). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
33
Wheeler, M. and Clark, A. (1999). Genic representation: reconciling content
and causal complexity. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
50 (pp. 103-135). Br Soc Philosophy Sci.
Wilson, J. (2005). Sensor Technology Handbook. Oxford: Elsevier Inc.
Winograd, T. and Flores, F. (1986). Understanding Computers and Cognition:
A New Foundation for Design. Norwood, New Jersea: Ablex Publishing
Corporation.
34
